RENEGOTIABLE SALES AND PROFITS
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BUSINESS SUBJECT TO IRENEGOTIATION

T HAS been suggested in the articles by Senator Walsh and Mr. James
that the basic purpose of the Renegotiation Act is the avoidance of
public scandal incident to exorbitant war profits; that the distinctive
features of renegotiation result from the effort of Congress to prevent
profiteering without discouraging production or putting a premium on
waste and inefficiency. It was to be expected that the categories of business subject to the act would be determined by consideration of the purpose of the act and of problems of administration. The history of the legislation and of its interpretation has been one of continuous controversy as
to the proper scope of renegotiation. No attempt will here be made to discuss the subject comprehensively. Instead, a few of the disputed areas
will be considered, in order to illustrate the problems of policy involved.
With a few exceptions, the original act was expressed as covering all
contracts with the Army and Navy Departments and the Maritime Commission and "subcontracts" thereunder. The act contained no definition of
"subcontracts," but the Departments soon adopted an interpretation of
the term as including not only subcontracts under which production of
some or all of the articles contracted for is delegated to a subcontractor,
but also purchases by the contractor of component parts and of supplies,
materials, machinery, or equipment "required" for the performance of
the contract. A similar definition of "subcontract" was inserted in the act
in October, 1942, a definition which has been amended in minor respects
only by the Revenue Act of 1943 . 1 (The amendments effected by this act
are referred to in this article as "the 1944 amendments.") This definition
is obviously very broad, and it is proposed to examine its scope first by
considering the principal proposals for limitation'or exemption.
Standard commercial articles.-The contention has been almost continuously made that sales of standard commercial articles should not be
subject to renegotiation. It is pointed out that standard products are not
like new types of heavy artillery, as to which costs of production defy
estimate. The pricing of standard products is not a matter of guess. It is
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also emphasized that prices for standard products are subject to OPA
ceilings and that in many lines there is a large number of producers. The
conclusion is drawn that with excess profits taxes at present levels renegotiation is not necessary for sales of these products.
These arguments were vigorously opposed, particularly by the Maritime Commission and the Navy, whose spokesmen pointed out that a
large part of the cost of ships represents components which are standard
commercial items. They flatly denied that excess profits taxes can be relied on to remove all exorbitant profits from such sales. They showed the
effect on profits of enormously increased volume of sales, volume expanded
sometimes ten to twenty fold, and insisted that prices reasonable for a
normal volume of production may be grossly excessive when the volume
is multiplied. Where the quantity demanded is so large, competition cannot be expected to bring about price reductions. Furthermore, price
regulation by the OPA scarcely touches the problem. None of the techniques worked out by the OPA in fixing prices takes account of the effect
of expanded volume on the costs of an individual firm. When the OPA
showed some signs of approaching its problem as a problem of profits, the
congressional reaction was so violent that the approach was hastily and
completely abandoned.
These arguments are so persuasive that it is difficult to understand the
War Department's original support of the exemption of standard articles.
Under Secretary Patterson urged the exemption in 1942, and testified in
June, 1943, that he was still personally in favor of it. This position may
have resulted from concern over the volume of administrative work involved in renegotiation, for until the end of 1943 it was by no means dear
that the task could be handled with the staffs available. But whatever
may have been the reason for the War Department's original position, in
the interests of a uniform policy the Department deferred to the opinion
of the Navy and the Maritime Commission. 2
An exemption of standard commercial articles would of course require
a definition of such articles, and the difficulty of framing such a definition
furnished an additional argument against the exemption. The difficulty is
illustrated by the definition inserted by the 1944 amendments. Here
"standard commercial article" is defined as an article "identical in every
material respect" with an article in general use prior to I94o. 3 The defini2 See Hearings, Sen. Corn. on Finance (and Subcom.) on Sec. 4o3 of Pub. Law No. 528,
Sess., Sept. 22-23, 29-30, 1942; Hearings, House Com. on Naval Affairs (78th
Cong., rst Sess.) pursuant to H. Res. 30, Vol. 2,June 10-30, 1943, at 925.
77 th Cong., 2d
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tion contains added requirements that the article be one sold in competition and subject to an OPA ceiling or at a price not in excess of the January 1, 1941, price. The 1944 amendments, however, did not themselves

,grant the exemption; they merely authorized the War Contracts Price
Adjustment Board to do so "if in the opinion of the Board, competitive
conditions affecting the sale of such article are such as will reasonably
protect the government against excessive prices.14 If this power is exercised, the action may, of course, be taken for limited classes of "standard
commercial articles" rather than for the entire class as defined in the act.
If standard articles were to be exempted in terms of the statutory definition, a host of questions would be inevitable as to the phrase "identical in
every material respect." Government specifications for "standard" articles commonly provide for slight changes in design or quality of materials
or acceptable tolerances. Questions as to the materiality of such deviations
would be constantly met and difficult to resolve.
Materials.-Suppliersof certain raw materials raised not only all of the
arguments urged for the "standard product" exemption, but also an argument based upon the exhaustion of their ore, oil, or timber reserves. They
urged that their business was not being increased but merely anticipated
by the war boom. Perhaps on the basis of this argument, an exemption
was inserted covering sales of the product of mines, oil wells, or timber,
which has not been processed beyond the first state suitable for industrial
use.5 The application of this exemption has presented many close questions and the Secretaries have issued a joint regulation interpreting the
language and listing many exempt products. An exemption for agricultural
products in similar terms has been inserted by the amendments of I944.6
The 1944 amendments also include a provision for the benefit of contractors who produce (or acquire) materials in an exempt state and process
them for sale in a form not exempt.7 In computing renegotiable profits,
such contractors shall have the benefit of a cost allowance approximating
the amount which the contrator would have realized if he had sold the
materials in their exempt state. In other words, in computing the profit
from the operations subject to renegotiation, the "cost" of the materials
in their exempt state is not to be determined by their actual cost to the
contractor but by the proceeds of the hypothetical sale in the exempt
state. This provision carries into the statute the substance of the administrative practice. It permits the contractor to adjust the valuation of his
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opening inventory of work in process as well as the cost of materials put
into production during the year. It is apparent, of course, what difficulties
are encountered in applying this rule, particularly in the absence of an
active market for the materials in their exempt state.
Machinery, equipment, and supplies.-Throughout the history of the
Renegotiation Act, there has been agitation for its limitation to prime
contracts (sales directly to the renegotiating agencies) and subcontracts
for component parts (and non-exempt materials). Such a limitation was
embodied in the 1944 amendments as they originally passed both the
House and the Senate, although the limitation was eliminated in conference.8 This exemption would, of course, eliminate renegotiation of sales of
machine tools and other equipment of long life, and the producers of such
equipment not only urged this general limitation of renegotiation to final
war products and component parts but also, in the alternative, a specific
exemption of sales of durable machinery and equipment. The Senate
amendments of 1944 also adopted this suggestion, exempting sales of
machinery, tools, and equipment "ordinarily having a useful life of more
than ten years."
While this exemption was eliminated in conference, the argument in its
favor was of considerable force. Emphasis was placed on the fact that the
greatly expanded wartime sales of such manufacturers would inevitably
result in a reduction of their post-war markets, that the war boom was for
them largely an anticipation of their normal sales for the next decade. (In
this respect the argument of the durable equipment producer was analogous to that urged, with greater success, by raw material producers. The
material producers viewed the future with alarm because of exhaustion of
their supply, whereas the alarm of equipment producers was based on the
exhaustion of their demand. In some respects the argument of the equipment producer seems the more persuasive.)
The principal weakness of the argument for the durable tool exemption
results from the wide differences in the degree to which the argument
applies to individual producers. It is most persuasive for a company producing only a line of standard durable equipment (such as turret lathes)
with a wide variety of uses. Apart from the possibility of developing new
lines of products, the outlook of such a company for the years immediately
following the war is admittedly dubious. Furthermore, with renegotiation
for 1942 an accomplished fact, and with volume of sales falling off, the
argument for exemption is increasingly strong.
In the case of producers of other types of equipment, however, the argu-

8 C.C.H. Special Reports onH. R. 3687, Revenue Bill 1943.
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ment is less persuasive. Some types of durable equipment have in prospect
a much more favorable post-war market, and the rejection of the proposed
exemption reflects a belief that it is impossible to formulate an exemption
which would not be either too broad or too narrow. The action of Congress
may be understood as a preference for a case-to-case appraisal of the
force of the market saturation argument and for its recognition in deciding
upon the profit margin which may be considered reasonable.
The proposal to limit renegotiation to sales of products furnished directly to the Government and of component parts thereof would have
exempted sales not only of durable equipment but also of consumable
tools and factory supplies. Producers of some of these products have had
a striking increase in volume of sales and profits, and they do not have the
serious problem of market saturation faced by producers of many types of
durable equipment. The Departments have therefore consistently opposed
the restriction of renegotiation to end-products and component parts.
. Articles "required"for performance of war contract-The foregoing discussion has dealt largely with controversies concerning proposals to reduce the scope of renegotiation. It remains to comment briefly on the
limits of the term "subcontract" as defined in October, 1942. In this definition, which continues in force without substantial change, the crucial
words are "agreement... to ...furnish any article, required for the performance of any other contract or subcontract." 9 As Mr. Berling has
pointed out, 0 the word "required" might have been given a very broad
interpretation, subjecting to renegotiation all sales (to prime contractors
or subcontractors) of office equipment and supplies, factory maintenance
items, and articles entering into factory construction. The Departments
ruled, however, that such items were too remote from factory operations
to be considered "required" for the purchaser's war production. Thus
there arose a distinction between processing equipment and supplies (renegotiable) and general equipment and supplies (non-renegotiable). For
a period before the administrative interpretation became settled it was
thought that sales of articles which became part of the realty were for that
reason exempt, although constituting direct processing equipment. This
notion was not finally adopted, although in most cases sales of building
materials, and other articles becoming part of the realty, are exempt as
sales of general, rather than processing, equipment. It is to be noted that
we are dealing here only with the limits of the concept "subcontract." All
sales direct to one of the Departments covered by the act are renegotiable,
9 Subsec.
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without regard to the character of the item sold, subject to the exemptions
listed in the act or promulgated pursuant to its terms.
The definition of "subcontract" has in practice been limited in other
directions. Where component parts are concerned, there is no limit to the
number of tiers of subcontracts, all subject to renegotiation. But a more
restricted interpretation is given to the concept of "articles required" for
the production of machinery the sale of which is a renegotiable subcontract. Contracts for components of such machinery are also renegotiable,
as are sales of machinery necessary for such production. The limit is set at
that point, excluding lower tier transactions and sales of supplies used in
making war production machinery. This limitation reflects an understandable desire to find some cut-off in the house-that-Jack-built series.
Another close question was presented by sales of equipment which is to
be used only partly for war production. The seller is permitted to treat as
renegotiable only the portion of the sale price which is proportionate to
the equipment's use in war production. As a matter of literal interpretation of the act, it might well have been ruled that since the equipment was
"required" for war production the entire purchase constitutes a subcontract. Such a ruling would also have been defensible from the viewpoint
of the general purpose of the act. Its rejection is probably to be understood as a minor concession to producers of durable equipment, justified
by the force of their general argument summarized above.
Procedure to determine renegotiable sales.-It has already been suggested that interpretation of the definitions of renegotiable contracts and
subcontracts is only a small part of the problem of determining the business of any contractor subject to renegotiation. The working out of a procedure for applying these definitions presents even greater difficulties
which can only be briefly suggested in this article. Here, even more than
in elaborating the definitions, there is need for practical adjustment.
The problem is simple where the contractor ,has relatively few sales
and where the purposes for which its products are purchased are known or
easily ascertainable. Sometimes efforts are made to secure such information by circularizing customers. It is often exceedingly difficult, however,
to formulate a questionnaire which will secure information which is relevant in terms of the criteria for renegotiability. More useful information
can usually be secured by informal inquiries. In cases where customers
are numerous, information is sometimes secured as to the more important
customers and the remainder of the sales segregated by application of the
percentages indicated by analysis of the larger accounts.
In some cases, the contractors have already available analyses of their
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sales according to the industries to which the customers belong. Particularly where a large number of small accounts is involved, a reasonable
method of sales segregation may be through the use of percentages for
each industry. Percentages suggested by reports of trade associations or
government agencies or by the experience of the renegotiating department
are frequently accepted by the parties where more accurate methods of
segregation are not practicable.
In other classes of cases, resort must be had to information given on
purchase orders pursuant to WPB regulations. These regulations, however, are different in different industries, and the requirements have been
frequently changed. The information is given in the form sometimes of
priority ratings and sometimes of "end-use" classification symbols.
While a tabulation of such information may furnish a satisfactory basis
for the segregation of sales, this will be true only where the nature and the
uses of the products suggest some correspondence between the particular
WPB symbols and the categories of renegotiable business. It must be
remembered, for example, that high priority ratings have been given for
purchase of items necessary for maintenance of operations in many plants
and institutions not engaged in war production.
It is apparent from the foregoing paragraphs that there is no uniform
method of segregating sales subject to renegotiation; nor is there a limited
number of methods whose application to different classes of production
can be standardized. Informal conferences between the contractor and the
renegotiators are necessary to reach agreement on the practicable method
which will give the fairest approximation to the total of renegotiable
sales. It is apparent also that the task of segregating sales is a most important one. The responsibility is placed upon the contractor to make the
segregation, but the methods employed must be scrutinized with the
greatest care by the renegotiator if the policy of the act is not to be defeated.
DETERMINATION OF RENEGOTIABLE PROFIT

The original act was worded in terms which made individual contracts,
rather than the operations of a fiscal period, the focus of renegotiation.!
Whenever the Secretary deemed that the profits from any contract or
subcontract might be excessive, he was directed to renegotiate the contract price. While a review of operations under individual contracts would
be highly desirable as a means of reaching sound prices on future contracts
for similar articles, two important objections to this approach were recog11 Subsec. (c) (i).
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nized early in the administration of the act. Contractors were quick to
urge that refund of excessive profits from individual contracts should not
be asked without adjustment for losses or inadequate profits on other
contracts. It soon appeared, furthermore, that the individual contract
approach was impracticable as a matter of administration. The "overall"
approach, however, was incorporated in the statute only gradually. By
the 1942 amendments, the Secretaries were merely empowered in their
discretion to renegotiate some or all of the contracts as a group. While
overall renegotiation for a fiscal year was almost universal practice from
the outset, it was not until the 1944 amendments that this method was
made mandatory, except by agreement of the parties.
The fiscal year approach, however, raises difficulties of its own, difficulties inherent in efforts to judge the profits of business enterprise for an
arbitrary period of time. Writers on economics and accounting have often
remarked that a satisfactory determination of profits is possible only after
the enterprise has ended and its assets been liquidated. The effort to ascertain profits for a shorter period is an effort to match items of revenue
and cost. In accounting practice this process is largely one of applying
conventional rules, rules which may be fairly satisfactory when applied
over a period of years. Some of these accounting rules, however, are open
to serious question if they are relied upon to secure a fair measure of a
year's profits for renegotiation purposes.
The general problem of annual profits has also arisen under the income
tax law. Especially with rising tax rates, it has been thought necessary to
make increasing use of various averaging devices, devices to carry forward and to carry back losses in order to avoid inequitable taxation in
years where application of conventional rules results in high profits. In renegotiation, contractors have often urged that the only war profits which
they should be asked to refund are those which appear excessive when
their entire war production has been completed. It is somewhat surprising
that their representatives before congressional committees have not urged
concrete proposals for making renegotiation tentative, with "excessive
profits" impounded (perhaps in the form of war bonds) but subject to
offset against later losses. Under the present act the board may agree to a
renegotiation period longer than one year, but there has apparently been
little use of this device. In the i944 amendments, Congress introduced a
provision for recomputation of excessive profits and possible return of renegotiation refund, but only in connection with recomputation for tax
purposes of the amortization of investment in emergency equipment.
With this single exception, a renegotiation agreement represents a final
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determination, in spite of doubts as to important items of cost and as to
the resulting profits. The situation has not become acute, largely because
of the substantial time lag between the accrual of profits and the determination of the refund. In most cases generous profits accrued since the
end of the fiscal year, renegotiated, have furnished a comfortable margin
of safety.
From the beginning, in the determination of renegotiable profit, allowance has been given for deductions recognized in income tax procedure.
Under the 1942 amendments, the Secretaries were required to recognize
exclusions and deductions "of the character" allowed under the Internal
Revenue Code.- The i944 amendments eliminated the quoted phrase
and required the allowance of cost items "estimated to be allowable"
under the code. 3 No attempt will be made in this article to review the
treatment of even the most important items of cost. Instead, two or three
cost problems will be discussed, in order to illustrate the dangers in tying
the concept of renegotiable profits too closely to that of taxable income.
It must be remembered, of course, that allowance of an item as a cost in
computing renegotiable profit does not preclude consideration of the cost
thus allowed as a factor bearing upon the reasonableness of the resulting
profit. Examples of such consideration often occur in connection with executive salaries. While the salaries paid may not be so high as to lead to
disallowance by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or in renegotiation, a
high level of salaries is a factor entitled to consideration in determining
excessive profits. Such consideration is obviously necessary in fairness to
contractors with unusally low overhead costs.
Deferred costs of development.-Under the tax law, the contractor is
given no discretion in the handling of developmental costs. They may be
taken as a deduction in the year paid or incurred and may not be deferred
and deducted in a later year. 4 In renegotiation, however, it would be obviously unfair if such costs were not considered properly allocable to the
-year or years in which the principal production takes place. Furthermore,
even where developmental costs were not deferred in the books of the contractor, where these preparations resulted in losses on war contracts in
the pre-renegotiation year, this is a factor which may be urged as bearing
upon the reasonableness of the profits subsequently earned.
Amortization of emergency equipment.-In many cases the principal
doubt as to profits realized arises from the investment of the contractor
in a plant, machinery, or equipment required for his war production.
12
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The problem is one of the recovery of this investment, a problem of the
amount which should be allowed against current revenue for amortization of the capital outlay.
The cost of "ordinary" capital investment is amortized by means of an
allowance for depreciation based upon an estimate of the useful life of the
equipment and representing a spreading of the net cost over the life by
some recognized method. With respect to additions necessary for handling
the large volume of war production, the chief difficulty is in estimating
the period during which the contractor will be able usefully (i.e., profitably) to employ the equipment. The problem was much debated during
the period of expanding defense preparations in 1939 and i94o. Finally, in

order to encourage investment in increased productive capacity, in the
Second Revenue Act of i94o, Congress added Section 124 to the Internal
Revenue Code. This section provided for the issuance of "certificates of
necessity" for investment in "emergency facilities." In computing taxable
income, the holder of such a certificate may amortize his investment at
twenty per cent per year regardless of the type of equipment or its probable life.
Nor is the taxpayer left, under this section, with the risk that he might
not have five years of war business against which to amortize his investment. If the emergency period should end before the amortization is
completed, or if the facility is certified as no longer necessary for war production, the taxpayer may re-open his tax returns for previous years and
recompute the amortization on the basis of the shorter period. This solution of the difficult problem may have been a fair one for tax purposes.
While it seems generous to the taxpayer, it must be remembered that if
the facility continues to be used after the amortization period, taxes must
be paid on the income so produced without further deduction for depredation or amortization of the investment.
In renegotiation, however, the problem is somewhat different. Under
the present act, renegotiation will expire on December 31, 1944, or not
later than June 30, 1945. Recognition of the twenty per cent amortization charge as a cost in computing renegotiable profits would give the
contractor a great advantage in cases where the property is likely to have
value after the amortization period. Take the case of a contractor who
has been operating in a plant rented on a short term lease. The contractor
builds a new plant under certificate of necessity, with the intention of
giving up production in the rented plant if post-war business does not
require both plants. Should such a contractor be allowed the twenty per
cent amortization charge as a cost of its renegotiable business?
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It was perhaps with such a case in view that the renegotiating agencies
agreed upon a very cautious statement of policy on this subject.,- It was
first stated that in computing profits the amortization charge is not to be
allowed as a cost, except to the extent of an appropriate depreciation
allowance. "However, the amount of such amortization in excess of depredation will be deducted from such profits and not considered as representing excessive profits for purposes of renegotiation." It is interesting to
speculate on what may have led the draftsman of this regulation to discriminate thus between allowance of the item as a cost and its recognition
as a deduction in computing renegotiable profits. The question becomes
even more puzzling in the light of the next sentence of the regulation: "In
determining whether and the extent to which profits remaining after deducting the amount of such amortization are excessive, consideration will
be given to the extent that it appears that the contractor... will have
residual value in the amortized facilities."
As already stated, the 1944 amendment requires the allowance as a cost
of all items estimated as allowable for tax purposes. Presumably, therefore, the board will revise the regulation on amortization. It should still be
able to consider probable residual value as bearing on the reasonable profit
margin. The case supposed, however, is one of the few where residual value
might confidently be asserted. In the usual case the contractor secures the
full benefit of twenty per cent amortization, since residual value is impossible to establish.
In one respect the 1944 amendments destroy the flexibility of renegotiation in respect to amortization. A new provision is inserted to deal with
the case in which, after a renegotiation refund has been made, the amortization period is shortened by the termination of the emergency or by a
finding that the facility is no longer necessary. The contractor is given a
right to a recomputation of this refund on the basis of a higher amortization charge (proportionate to the shorter period). The recomputation is
apparently to be a matter of arithmetic without a new opportunity to
consider residual value-at a time when a reasonable approximation of
such value might perhaps be made. It is not difficult to imagine cases in
which this provision might operate to give the contractor a wind-fall.
Allocation of costs to renegotiable business.:-The problem of determination of renegotiable profit has been discussed above as a problem of allowable costs. This is only half of the problem, and usually the easier half, in
X5
J-PAB-s(a), published in Joint Statement by the War, Navy and Treasury Departments
and the Maritime Commission, "Purposes, Principles, Policies, and Interpretations," March
31) 1943.
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any case.where the contractor has a substantial portion of his sales not
subject to renegotiation. In these cases it is necessary to allocate cost
items between renegotiable and non-renegotiable business in order to ascertain the profit to be renegotiated. As with the problem of segregation
of sales, determination of an acceptable method of cost allocation usually
requires detailed study of the nature of the respective products, their
methods of production and distribution, and the nature of the records
kept by the contractor.
These records often make it possible to determine with some accuracy
the "prime cost" (material and direct labor) of sales subject to renegotiation. This is true not only where the contractor has records of such costs
by contract or job, but also where departmental, plant, or product costs
are separately kept and where the renegotiable sales include all of the
sales of certain departments, plants, or products. Where "prime cost" is
thus known, factory overhead is usually added on the basis of standard
cost records, if such a cost system is in operation, or on the basis of percentages established by experience, or by an analysis and allocation of
individual items of factory expense. From these computations, together
with adjustments for changes in inventories, the "cost of sales" is determined for the renegotiable business.
It is sometimes necessary to accept much less satisfactory methods of
allocation. The production of the contractor's regular products and of
new war products may be carried on in the same plant and without separate records even of labor and material costs. Here it may be necessary to
base the allocation upon pre-war cost experience in the regular line, determining cost of non-renegotiable sales on this basis and assigning the
balance of the costs to the war production.
Items of selling, general, and administrative expenses must then be
allocated, a process normally involving analysis of the respective items
and consideration of the appropriate allocation for each. For example,
expenses of maintenance of local sales offices should be allocated entirely
to non-renegotiable business where these offices have nothing to do with
the sales subject to renegotiation.
In some cases where the contractor's entire business consists of sales
of a single product or of a homogeneous line, it is reasonable to allocate
costs in proportion to sales. If the same prices have been charged in both
categories of business, the allocation may be on the basis of aggregate
dollar sales. If not, there must be allocation by product units or by dollar
sales adjusted to neutralize the effect of the price differential.
This brief statement of the problem of cost allocation makes it clear
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that the results of renegotiation will often be very materially affected by
decisions as to the allocation method. Especially in cases where the contractors' accounting records are relatively crude, there is serious danger
that excessive profits on renegotiable business may remain hidden in the
absence of vigorous work by analysts of the renegotiation staff.
RENEGOTIATION AND TERMINATION

The general subject of settlements on termination of war contracts (by
action of the Government) is beyond the scope of this article. The relation between renegotiation and termination settlements may briefly be
discussed, however, since there is in a sense a conflict between the overall
approach of renegotiation and the contract by contract method of handling termination settlements.
In the first place, when termination claims are being audited it would
seem important to make sure that reimbursement is not granted for costs
allowed in previous renegotiations, a matter which may involve considerable difficulty. For some cases it would seem desirable to deal with the
matter by insertion of a clause in the renegotiation agreement waiving or
limiting the scope of termination claims.
I A second aspect of the problem relates to the profit allowed in the termination settlement. The termination officers were formerly authorized
to exempt the settlement from renegotiation, if satisfied that no excessive
profits were involved. The exercise of this authority, however, would have
required the officer to examine into the complex of factors considered in a
renegotiation, a task which would greatly prolong the termination negotiations. It is not surprising, therefore, that payments in termination
settlements are now made subject to overall renegotiation.
This fact might seem to justify suggesting that termination settlements
may safely be made without detailed review of costs and profits. The reduction of the administrative work in connection with terminations
would, of course, be a great boon. But renegotiation is slated to end with
review of operations prior to December 31, 1944 (or not later than June
30, 1945), and serious questions may also arise out of the statutory provisions limiting the period within which renegotiation proceedings may be
instituted where contracts have been terminated. In many cases, therefore, renegotiation cannot be relied on to "mop up" after termination, and
vigilance on the part of terminations officers is essential, with respect to
both items of cost and margins of profit.

